France and Germany Compete to Rebuild Argentina’s Submarine Fleet
Argentina is weighing fully financed offers from France and Germany to acquire three new conventional attack submarines, a move that would restore an underwater capability lost nearly a decade ago and carry longer-term implications for South Atlantic security.
On 7–8 October 2026, Admiral Marcelo Dalle Nogare (also reported as Della Nogare), Chief of the Joint Staff of the Argentine Armed Forces, stated that both countries had offered to finance 100 per cent of the purchase of three diesel-electric submarines, with repayment in instalments.
The Argentine Navy has completed its technical evaluation of the two designs and passed its recommendations to the government. The final decision rests with President Javier Milei and will be driven by financing terms, delivery timelines, and broader geopolitical considerations. No contract has yet been signed.
Argentina’s submarine gap
Argentina has operated no fully capable submarines since the loss of the TR-1700-class ARA San Juan in November 2017. The remaining Type 209 boat, ARA Salta (commissioned in 1974), is used only for limited training, and Argentine submariners have relied on occasional sea training with other navies, including Peru’s.
The navy has long argued that new submarines are needed for surveillance of Argentina’s large exclusive economic zone, monitoring of foreign fishing activity, and a basic ability to track the movements of neighbouring fleets, notably those of Brazil and Chile, which operate modern submarines.
The draft 2027 national budget includes authorisation for the government to borrow up to approximately US$2.3 billion for three submarines to be based at Mar del Plata, alongside separate funding for surface ships. Inclusion in the budget does not itself constitute a procurement decision.
The competing offers
France’s Naval Group is offering its Scorpène family (reported as the Scorpène Evolved or an ocean-going variant similar to the Brazilian Riachuelo-class boats). Argentina signed a non-binding letter of intent with France in late 2024. Negotiations have been slowed by the absence of a firm French state-guaranteed export credit facility. Brazilian experience with the design, including construction and maintenance facilities at Itaguaí, is viewed as a practical advantage
Germany’s ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) is offering the Type 209NG, a modernised evolution of the long-serving Type 209 design. In early 2025 the Bundestag budget committee approved export credit guarantees covering up to roughly €4.1 billion for a prospective contract estimated in the €2–2.3 billion range. Possible delivery dates have been discussed for 2034–2035. German officials have been more proactive on financing support than their French counterparts in recent reporting.
Admiral Dalle Nogare has described both boats as meeting the navy’s technical requirements and has emphasised that the choice will ultimately be “a geopolitical decision… and above all of financing.” Five to six years from contract signature to the first boat is a commonly cited timescale.
Strategic context
The offers come against the backdrop of Argentina’s longstanding claim to the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas). Argentine officials have stated that the submarine programme is not linked to any intention to seize the islands by force, though some commentary has noted that a restored submarine capability could raise the economic and military costs of the British presence. The islands lie outside NATO’s Article 5/6 geographic scope. The United Kingdom maintains a modest standing force there (Typhoon fighters, air defence systems, and a patrol vessel), but has no permanent anti-submarine warfare assets on station; any renewed Argentine submarine threat would require additional Royal Navy escorts, surveillance assets, or uncrewed systems to be surged from thousands of kilometres away.
France and Germany have both deepened defence cooperation with the UK in recent years (including agreements such as Trinity House and the Lancaster House framework), yet national export decisions remain sovereign. The United Kingdom retains some leverage through export controls on components, as demonstrated in past cases involving third-country sales to Argentina.
Outlook
Even if a contract is signed in the near term, the first new Argentine submarine is unlikely to enter service before the early-to-mid 2030s. This gives the Royal Navy and wider UK defence establishment time to adapt, but also highlights the resource pressures of maintaining a credible deterrent in the South Atlantic while meeting NATO and other commitments.
For Argentina, the programme represents an attempt to reverse years of naval decline; for France and Germany, it is a commercial competition in which financing terms may prove more decisive than pure technical performance. The outcome remains open.
