Restore Supporters will choose to vote for the Conservatives rather than Reform UK

Restore Britain supporters would vote for the Conservatives if Restore Britain didn't exist after 14 years of political failure.

The Conservatives went from the best political party with a huge majority to losing it within 4 years, yet people still want to vote for them.

Rupert Lowe’s Restore Britain, launched as a pressure group in 2025 and registered as a party in early 2026 after Lowe’s departure from Reform UK, has carved out a harder-right niche.

It emphasizes ethno-nationalist themes, large-scale deportations, and critiques of immigration levels and cultural change that its supporters see as inadequately addressed by either the Conservatives during their 14 years in office (2010–2024) or by Reform.

Polling and by-election results place it in the 3–8% range nationally, with stronger local showings (e.g., 6.8% in the Makerfield by-election and 8.7% in the Greater Manchester mayoral contest, ahead of the Conservatives in both cases)

Voter attitudes from YouGov:

YouGov’s 2026 Big Voter Study of Restore supporters found high issue alignment with Reform voters—particularly on immigration (around 90% of Restore backers list it as a top priority). Yet personal and party evaluations diverge. Only about 30% of Restore supporters hold a positive view of Nigel Farage (net rating around –37), while roughly 37% view Kemi Badenoch positively (though still net negative overall). Critically, just 36% of Restore voters say they would consider voting Reform in a future election, compared with 23% open to the Conservatives.

This indicates that many Restore supporters have actively turned away from Farage and Reform rather than treating the parties as interchangeable. Reasons cited for backing Restore include perceptions that it is more honest about national issues, more trustworthy specifically on immigration, and closer to supporters’ values, alongside personal affinity for Lowe. A majority (around 61%) report no reservations about Restore itself—higher loyalty than for Reform or the main parties.

Broader right-wing shifts and the 14-year context:

The Conservatives’ long period in government is widely associated with record net migration, limited delivery on border control promises, and other policy shortfalls that fueled Reform’s 2024 surge (14.3% nationally).

That failure created space on the right. Subsequent fragmentation has cut both ways: Matt Goodwin’s analysis of 2024 Reform voters indicates roughly 17% have moved toward the Conservatives versus around 10% to Restore.

Reform is thus losing more support back to the Tories than further rightward to Restore, even as Conservatives have shown recovery in some 2026 polls (occasionally overtaking Reform).

Restore draws primarily from former Reform voters, some ex-Conservatives, and non-voters. Its supporters tend to be highly motivated on identity, borders, and cultural issues, with limited enthusiasm for tactical voting. Only a minority view either Farage or Badenoch favorably enough to switch easily.

A Restore–Reform pact has been shown in polling to risk further erosion among both Reform’s core and potential Conservative-to-Reform switchers.